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ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS: Winter Report, self-regula-
tion, corporate-governance codes, inter-
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board disclosure in Europe
Although self-regulation has proven to be effective for the
development of voluntary corporate-governance codes,
the results of this study indicate that leading European
companies are not yet too concerned about compliance
with these codes. While self-regulation appears to be
ineffective to change the disclosure practices of companies,
the study concludes that factors relevant for choosing
regulatory forms and the impact and risks involved with
non-compliance of companies with voluntary codes have
determined the Winter Report’s emphasis on self-
regulation.
INTRODUCTION
Triggered by financial irregularities in the
USA, and partly in response to the extra-
territorial implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the European Union (EU) responded in
2002 with the publication of the Winter
Report of the High Level Group of Com-
pany Law Experts.1 One year later, the EU
has initiated a public debate on its corporate
governance Action Plan based on the Winter
Report.2 The report emphasises the import-
ance of voluntary disclosure by boards of
directors to avoid financial scandals and to
boost investor confidence in EU member
states. Although the Winter Report under-
lines the importance of voluntary codes of
conduct, critics seem to be well positioned to
question the effectiveness of these codes on
board behaviour and disclosure.
This paper reviews the introduction of
voluntary codes across Europe as part of a
greater global development by financial
markets to effect changes in the structure
and behaviour of boards of directors. By
analysing the level of board disclosure of
483 listed corporations in 12 countries
(eight EU member states and four non-
EU countries), this paper reviews the
impact of more than ten years of corporate
governance codes across Europe. The
paper concludes that, despite years of
self-regulation, disclosure levels continue to
differ greatly across Europe. In spite of the
limited impact corporate governance codes
seem to have had on board practices, the
small risks associated with non-compliance
seem to justify the role voluntary codes of
conduct play in improving investor con-
fidence.
THE WINTER REPORT
While most media attention was directed at
the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act in the USA, Chairman Jaap Winter of
the High Level Group of Company Law
Experts presented a report on a ‘Modern
Regulatory Framework for Company Law
in Europe’ to EU Commissioner Frits
Bolkestein on 4th November, 2002. This
important report for regulators in the EU did
not receive much attention from the media
or from corporate governance experts outside
Europe. This was remarkable, since this
report has been used as the basis for the EU
action plan for corporate governance
published in May 2003.
The Winter Report and the EU action
plan display great confidence in the effec-
tiveness of self-regulation in corporate gov-
ernance to enforce stricter disclosure
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requirements across the EU. More specifi-
cally, the Winter Report states:
‘Disclosure can be a powerful regulatory
tool: it creates an incentive to comply with
best practice, and allows members and
third parties to take necessary actions.
Disclosure requirements can be more
efficient, more flexible and easier to
enforce.’3
The report reviews a great number of issues
related to the corporate governance practices
of Europe’s leading companies. Through the
use of national voluntary codes of conduct
and the enforcement of standards of conduct
on a ‘comply or explain’ basis at a minimum,
the Winter Report recommends that listed
companies disclose more information on the
role of non-executive and supervisory direc-
tors, management remuneration, the respon-
sibility of management for financial
statements and auditing practices. Table 1
summarises most of the Winter Report’s
recommendations to improve the disclosure
practices of boards of directors of listed
corporations.
SELF-REGULATION AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
The emphasis of the Winter Report on
voluntary disclosure is not new to most
financial markets. Self-regulation has been
favoured by most international financial
markets to develop and implement modern
corporate governance standards. According
to the European Corporate Governance
Institute, more than 107 codes, including
revisions of existing codes, have been
introduced since 1992 in 35 countries.4 In
Europe alone, more than 55 codes have been
introduced in 19 countries.5
The early self-regulation initiatives in the
UK have had a tremendous impact on the
development of corporate governance stan-
dards in other European countries and across
the globe (see Figures 1 and 2).
The globalisation of self-regulation can be
categorised by four distinctive phases: the first
phase, modern code development, began in
the UK with the introduction of the
Cadbury Code in 1992.7
Subsequent to the developments in the
UK, the second phase occurred between
1994 and 1996, dominated by the develop-
ment of codes of best practices mainly in
other Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions; codes that
were heavily influenced by the publication of
the Cadbury Code and the Greenbury
Report.8 In France, however, as one of the
first continental European countries to
develop a code, the 1995 Vie´not Report
recommended that directors reduce the
number of cross-directorships and suggested
the appointment of at least two independent
directors to boards of listed corporations;9
soon afterwards, in October 1996, the Cı´rculo
de Empresarios was introduced in Spain.10
During the third phase in the globalisation
of corporate governance standards (1997–
2000), further continental European coun-
tries introduced codes of best practice. These
included the Dutch Peters Report in 1997;
the Belgian Cardon Report in 1998; the
Vie´not II Report in 1999; the recent Swiss
Code of Best Practice; and many others.11
Following the Asian financial crisis, voluntary
codes were introduced to financial markets
across the continent, including in Japan with
the Keidanrein Report in 1997; the CII’s
Corporate Governance Code in India in
1999; the Korean Committee on Corporate
Governance in 1999; and the Malaysian
Report on Corporate Governance in
2000.12 In Indonesia, the National Commit-
tee on Corporate Governance published a
draft version of the Indonesian Code of
Good Corporate Governance in 2000, which
was updated in 2001.13
As part of the fourth phase, and mainly
under the influence of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), the
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Table 1: Winter Report: Overview of recommendations
Issue Recommendations of the Winter Report Section
Disclosure The EU, in considering new — and amending existing — regulations or
company law, should carefully consider whether disclosure requirements are
better suited to achieve the desired effects than substantive rules. Any
disclosure requirement should be based on the obligation to provide fair,
relevant and meaningful information.
II.3
New
Technology
Listed companies should be required to maintain and continuously update a
company information section on their websites, and maintain links with
public registers and other relevant authorities.
II.6
Corporate
Governance
Statement
Listed companies should be required to include in their annual report and
accounts a coherent and descriptive statement covering the key elements of
the corporate governance rules and practices to which they apply. This
statement should also be separately posted on the company’s website. Such a
statement should contain a reference to the designated national code of
corporate governance and/or company law rules with which the company
complies or in relation to which it explains deviations.
III.1
Independence Listed companies should be required to disclose in their annual corporate
governance statement which of their directors they consider to be
independent and on what grounds. Similar disclosure should be made
when a new director is proposed for appointment.
III.10
Composition Listed companies should include in their annual corporate governance
statement a profile of the board’s composition, and they should explain why
individual non-executive or supervisory directors are qualified to serve on
the board in their particular roles. Similar disclosure should be made in
proposals for initial appointment.
III.10
Interlocks Listed companies should be required to disclose what board positions in
other companies their non-executive or supervisory directors hold.
III.10
Remuneration The remuneration policy for directors generally should be disclosed in the
financial statements of the company, and should be an explicit item for
debate on the agenda of the annual meeting. The individual remuneration of
directors of the company, both executive and non-executive or supervisory
directors, is to be disclosed in detail in the financial statements of the
company.
Schemes granting shares and share options and other forms of
remuneration of directors linked to the share price should require the
prior approval of the shareholders’ meeting, on the basis of a proper
explanation by the remuneration committee of the applicable rules and of
their likely costs.
The costs of all share-incentive schemes should be properly reflected in
the annual accounts, and this accounting principle should be recognised in a
European framework rule.
III.11
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) and the International
Finance Corporation (IFC; part of the World
Bank Group), Russia and other eastern
European countries started the development
of corporate-governance standards.15 The
modernisation of corporation laws in the
former Soviet Union began in 1996 with
the enactment of the new Russian Law on
Joint Stock Companies. The Russian
Corporate Governance Code was introduced
in April 2002, four months after the Russian
Federation significantly amended its Law on
Joint Stock Companies.16 In June 2002,
Poland also completed its final draft of the
‘Corporate Governance Code for Listed
Polish Corporations’; countries in the
Balkans are modernising their company
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Figure 2: The globalisation of corporate governance standards14
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Figure 1: Phases in the globalisation of corporate governance standards6
laws with the assistance of the USA and
the EU.17
Meanwhile, the private sector in the UK
appears to have embarked on a new round of
self-regulatory initiatives with the publication
of the Smith Report on audit committees,
the Higgs Report on the role and effective-
ness of non-executive directors and the
Combined Code on Corporate Governance
in 2003.18 Given the popularity of these
codes, more national codes can be expected
in the near future.
PAN-EUROPEAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODES
Although Europe witnessed some attempts to
establish pan-European codes of corporate
governance, such as the OECD principles on
corporate governance,19 it appears to be
unlikely that a pan-European code will be
introduced by the EU, in line with the
recommendations of the Winter Report.
According to the drafters of the Winter
Report:
‘The adoption of such a code would not
achieve full information for investors
about the key corporate governance rules
applicable to companies across Europe, as
these rules would still be based on and part
of national company laws that are in
certain aspects widely divergent. We also
doubted whether additional Europe-wide
voluntary rules would contribute to the
improvement of corporate governance, as
Europe would either have to allow many
alternative rules, depending on the various
company law systems, or to confine itself
to abstract, and perhaps largely mean-
ingless, rules which would be compatible
with all of these systems.’20
DETERMINANTS OF EFFECTIVE
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
The confidence of the Winter Report in
disciplining markets with voluntary disclo-
sure is not shared by all academics and market
observers who have been reporting on
deficiencies of capital markets’ protection of
shareholders. Cuervo pleads for fewer codes
of corporate governance and more market
control.21 These authors believe that the
absence of an effective corporate-control
market that disciplines controlling share-
holders; the weakness of institutional inves-
tors;22 and the widespread adoption of
managerial defence mechanisms23 are major
barriers preventing minority shareholders
from exercising their rights.
Besides these market constraints, criticism
is also directed at the effectiveness of self-
regulation as a mechanism to set and enforce
corporate governance standards. Whittington
indicates that self-regulation has an enforce-
ment problem when new standards conflict
with the interests of parties involved.24 As
stated more profoundly by Finch:
‘Self-regulatory structures are prone to a
number of criticisms — that, for instance,
they favour the regulated group and
ignore the broader public interest; they
are designed with large, well-organised,
well-resourced enterprises in mind and fail
to deal with those who really need to be
regulated; their procedures tend to exclude
third parties; they are low on account-
ability; they have anti-competitive effects;
they tend not to enjoy public confidence;
and their investigative, enforcement and
sanctioning processes tend to be weak.’25
The criticism related to the effectiveness of
self-regulation in corporate governance has
not been well supported by the limited
number of studies on the impact of voluntary
codes of conduct on the corporate govern-
ance practices of corporations. The authors of
this paper could find only a few impact
assessments and monitoring reports on the
implementation of voluntary codes.26 But
more troublesome for proponents of
voluntary corporate governance standards
seems to be the inconclusive evidence on
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the relationship between the implementation
of corporate governance standards and the
performance of corporations. Interestingly,
there appears to be an increasing awareness
that the conventional corporate governance
interventions proposed by most corporate
governance codes are not necessarily posi-
tively associated with the performance of
corporations.27
As an example, most corporate governance
codes promote the independence of boards
of directors. Not only do the definitions of
independent boards vary widely; a positive
relationship with the performance of cor-
porations is difficult to claim. To illustrate
this, Bhagat and Black state:
‘At the very least there is no convincing
evidence that increasing board indepen-
dence, relative to the norms that currently
prevail among large American firms, will
improve firm performance. And there is
some evidence suggesting the opposite —
that firms with supermajority-independent
boards perform worse than other firms,
and that firms with more inside than
independent directors perform about as
well as firms with majority- (but not
supermajority-) independent boards.’28
RESEARCH APPROACH
This study has not attempted to measure the
relationship between the implementation of
corporate governance standards and the
financial performance of corporations. Nor
has it measured the impact on shareholder
confidence of specific voluntary corporate
governance codes in particular countries.
Instead, this study reviewed the quantity of
information companies disclosed about their
boards of directors in their 2001 annual
reports. Its authors reviewed a total of 483
annual reports of listed companies in 12
European countries (see Table 2). In par-
ticular, the study collected basic information
on the number of board meetings, the
composition of the board of directors, the
use of board committees and the leadership
structure of the board. In addition, the
authors reviewed the amount of information
disclosed on the remuneration and demo-
graphic information of 4,995 individual
directors occupying a total of 6,093 board
positions in the companies surveyed. A
majority, 305 companies (63 per cent), have
a one-tier board. The remaining 178 com-
panies (37 per cent) have a board of directors
based on a two-tier structure (see Table 3).
FINDINGS
This study examined the disclosure of
information on board demographics and the
tenure of directors (see Table 4). Few
companies (28.8 per cent) disclose the
nationality of their directors. Less than half
of the total number of directors have their
tenure with the company disclosed (49.5 per
cent). Age is disclosed for 62.7 per cent of
directors. Of the data examined, the gender
of directors is most often indicated in annual
reports (98.5 per cent).
Companies also seemed to resist disclosing
the number of meetings their boards of
directors had held in 2001 (see Table 5); one-
third of the companies (33.3 per cent) did not
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Table 2: Number of companies
Country
Number of
companies
Percentage of
total
Belgium 20 4.1
Czech Republic 16 3.3
France 39 8.1
Germany 30 6.2
Italy 27 5.6
Netherlands 100 20.7
Poland 14 2.9
Russia 10 2.1
Spain 31 6.4
Sweden 21 4.3
Switzerland 25 5.2
United Kingdom 150 31.1
Total: 483 100.0
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Table 3: Number of directors and their positions in boards
Countries Directors Positions Companies
12 Males: 4,637 Executive: 1,883 One-Tier Boards: 305
Females: 270 Non-Executive: 4,122 Two-Tier Boards: 178
Unknown: 88 Unknown: 88
Total: 4,995 Total: 6,093 Total: 483
Table 4: Disclosure of demographics and tenure
Country
Number of
positions
Disclosure of
nationality
Disclosure of
gender
Disclosure of
age
Disclosure of
tenure
Belgium 271 59 21.8% 264 97.4% 145 53.5% 98 36.2%
Czech Republic 221 190 86.0 221 100.0 102 46.2 63 28.5
France 603 172 28.5 594 98.5 420 69.7 279 46.3
Germany 733 47 6.4 732 99.9 300 40.9 226 30.8
Italy 384 4 1.0 372 96.9 34 8.9 7 1.8
Netherlands 896 711 79.4 844 94.2 803 89.6 571 63.7
Poland 200 130 65.0 200 100.0 13 6.5 9 4.5
Russia 226 212 93.8 223 98.7 44 19.5 24 10.6
Spain 453 8 1.8 452 99.8 38 8.4 80 17.7
Sweden 256 18 7.0 254 99.2 203 79.3 185 72.3
Switzerland 224 76 33.9 224 100.0 120 53.6 52 23.2
United Kingdom 1,626 129 7.9 1,623 99.8 1,600 98.4 1,419 87.3
Total: 6,093 1,756 28.8% 6,003 98.5% 3,822 62.7% 3,013 49.5%
Table 5: Disclosure of board committees and board meetings
Country
Number of
companies
Number of
committees
Number of
positions
Disclosure of
committee
meetings
Disclosure of
board
meetings
Belgium 20 53 271 22 41.5% 19 95.0%
Czech Republic 16 17 221 0 0.0 1 6.3
France 39 100 603 70 70.0 28 71.8
Germany 30 86 733 49 57.0 28 93.3
Italy 27 53 384 17 32.1 14 51.9
Netherlands 100 163 896 52 31.9 83 83.0
Poland 14 14 200 0 0.0 0 0.0
Russia 10 14 226 0 0.0 1 10.0
Spain 31 87 453 32 36.8 21 67.7
Sweden 21 39 256 9 23.1 17 81.0
Switzerland 25 63 224 5 7.9 10 40.0
United Kingdom 150 574 1,626 179 31.2 100 66.7
Total: 483 1,263 6,093 435 25.5% 322 66.7%
disclose the number of board meetings. Most
of the companies surveyed in Belgium did
disclose information about the number of
board meetings held (95 per cent). One-
fourth of the companies (25.5 per cent)
disclosed the number of meetings of board
committees. French companies were leaders
in disclosing information about these meet-
ings (70 per cent).
The disclosure of the individual remunera-
tion of non-executive directors, as opposed
to total remuneration of the entire board, is
most frequently observed in the UK, Italy,
France and the Netherlands. Although the
first steps have been made by companies in
other countries, individual remuneration of
non-executive directors is disclosed for just
31.6 per cent of the directors in the study.
The individual remuneration of independent
non-executive directors is on average more
often disclosed than for other non-executive
directors (see Table 6).
The disclosure of the individual remunera-
tion of executive directors is again most
frequently observed in the UK, Italy, France
and the Netherlands. The individual remu-
neration of executive directors is disclosed for
44 per cent of the directors in the study. The
individual remuneration of chief executive
officers is on average more often disclosed
than that of other executive directors (see
Table 7).
Across Europe, the independence of non-
executive directors is disclosed by less than
one-third of the companies reviewed (32.9
per cent), including directors who have been
classified as non-independent in annual
reports. The greatest level of disclosure of
the independence of directors is found in the
UK, Belgium, Italy and France. This study
could not find any indication of the
disclosure of the independence of non-
executive directors in the Czech Republic,
Germany, Poland or Russia (see Table 8).
THE WINTER REPORT AND THE
FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY
The level of corporate governance disclosure
in the annual reports of companies across
Europe included in this study appears to be
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Table 6: Disclosure of remuneration of non-executive directors
Country
Number of
non-executive
positions
Disclosure of
individual
remuneration
Disclosure of
chairman
remuneration
Disclosure of
independent
member
remuneration
Disclosure of
common
member
remuneration
Belgium 214 20 9.3% 1 8.3% 7 8.8% 19 9.8%
Czech Republic 131 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
France 475 185 38.9 5 33.3 63 57.8 175 39.5
Germany 527 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Italy 293 136 46.4 4 66.7 48 51.1 126 46.0
Netherlands 546 114 20.9 13 13.7 0 0.0 93 22.0
Poland 112 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Russia 111 5 4.5 1 12.5 0 0.0 4 4.1
Spain 381 7 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 1.7
Sweden 228 19 8.3 5 38.5 0 0.0 11 5.6
Switzerland 184 7 3.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 3.8
United Kingdom 920 809 87.9 86 91.5 595 91.5 672 87.2
Total: 4,122 1,302 31.6% 115 35.7% 713 68.2% 1,112 31.3%
limited, despite the more than 50 corporate
governance guidelines that have been intro-
duced in Europe since 1992. This raises the
intriguing question of why the ‘High Level
Group of Company Law Experts’ responsible
for drafting the Winter Report emphasised
the effectiveness of self-regulation and dis-
closure. Why do these experts leave the
development of corporate governance stan-
dards for boards of directors in the EU to the
market? Why do they emphasise self-regula-
tion, when self-regulatory structures are
criticised and evidence on the impact of
self-regulation is limited?
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Table 7: Disclosure of remuneration of executive directors
Country
Number of
executive
positions
Disclosure of
individual
remuneration
Disclosure of
chairman
remuneration
Disclosure of
CEO
remuneration
Disclosure of
common
member
remuneration
Belgium 56 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Czech Republic 90 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
France 107 29 27.1 12 36.4 10 34.5 15 24.6
Germany 206 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Italy 60 29 48.3 9 60.0 8 47.1 9 39.1
Netherlands 350 114 32.6 23 43.4 9 20.9 80 31.9
Poland 88 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Russia 115 8 7.0 0 0.0 1 16.7 7 7.6
Spain 65 1 1.5 0 0.0 1 5.6 0 0.0
Sweden 22 7 31.8 1 33.3 7 35.0 0 0.0
Switzerland 21 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.
United Kingdom 703 641 91.2 50 94.3 127 93.4 462 90.1
Total: 1,883 829 44.0% 95 38.5% 163 50.9% 573 44.4%
Table 8: Disclosure of the independence of non-executive directors
Country
Number of
non-executive
positions
Independent
non-executives
Non-independent
non-executives
Dependency
disclosed
Belgium 214 80 37.4% 73 34.1% 71.5%
Czech Republic 131 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
France 475 109 22.9 85 17.9 40.8
Germany 527 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Italy 293 94 32.1 48 16.4 48.5
Netherlands 546 11 2.0 0 0.0 2.0
Poland 112 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Russia 111 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Spain 381 64 16.8 24 6.3 23.1
Sweden 228 14 6.1 1 0.4 6.6
Switzerland 184 23 12.5 2 1.1 13.6
United Kingdom 920 650 70.7 79 8.6 79.2
Total: 4,122 1,045 25.4% 312 7.6% 32.9%
The answer can be found in the factors
that are relevant for choosing regulatory forms
such as self-regulation, quasi-regulation and
legislation (‘black-letter law’) and the impact
and risks involved with non-compliance with
voluntary corporate governance codes.
FACTORS RELEVANT FOR CHOOSING
REGULATORY FORMS
Two main factors, among others, seem to be
relevant for choosing regulatory forms or
government interventions through legislation
to improve the corporate governance stan-
dards of listed companies: the nature of the
corporate governance problems and the risks
associated with these problems.29 By under-
standing the nature of corporate governance
problems, policy makers can assess the need
to regulate corporate governance risks
through legislation or by using voluntary
standards. By making a risk assessment of
corporate governance problems; the par-
ticular impact that the corporate governance
practices of companies can have on society at
large; the significance of the impact; and the
frequency with which the problems (can)
occur, regulators can determine what kind of
regulatory form is most desirable. For ex-
ample, in EU member states the operations
of nuclear power plants are strictly regulated
by legislation. Although the likelihood of a
nuclear accident is limited, the potential
impact and the risks associated with a nuclear
accident are great. Voluntary codes alone
cannot be used to ensure that electricity
producers adhere to strict safety standards,
since the potential impact and the risks
associated with malfunctions of nuclear
power plants are simply too great not to
regulate through legislation.
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Low risk, low impact
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Quasi-regulation
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Figure 3: Risk and impact of non-compliance with voluntary corporate governance codes31
As stated by the Australian Common-
wealth Interdepartmental Committee on
Quasi-Regulation (CICQR):
‘As a general guide, if the risk of an event is
low, and its impact is also low, then there
would be little need for a strong regulatory
hand by government . . . Conversely, if
there is a high risk of a particular event
occurring, and significant impacts on a
national scale are likely — for example,
widespread outbreaks of disease or plane
crashes if minimum standards are not
followed — then governments may
choose to intervene to ensure standards
are enforced.’30
The relationship between risks and regula-
tory forms is illustrated in Figure 3.
CONCLUSIONS
The relationship between corporate govern-
ance risks and regulatory forms appears to be
well understood by the drafters of the Winter
Report. As suggested by Figure 3, corporate
failures such as Enron can be avoided only
when companies are forced to comply with
legislation. The great risks and impact these
corporate failures have on the confidence of
investors can justify the development of more
stringent corporate legislation, such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. On the other hand, the
impact of companies not complying with
voluntary corporate governance codes seems
not to justify more company legislation in
many EU member states. Indeed, the con-
troversial findings on the impact of corporate
governance standards on the financial per-
formance of corporations and the absence of
quantifiable data seem to support the Winter
Report’s approach: to refrain from further
legislative intervention. In fact, the Winter
Report clearly states that the market is the
right place to enforce compliance with
standards propagated by most voluntary
corporate governance codes. The risks
associated with non-compliance with
voluntary corporate governance codes are
too small to justify further legislation.
Given the results of this study, a great
majority of Europe’s leading companies are
not yet too concerned about non-compli-
ance with voluntary codes and apparently
also do not understand the competitive
advantages of setting greater corporate gov-
ernance standards. Only a minority of leading
companies has discovered compliance to be a
valuable tool to improve reputation, to
increase the value of a company’s assets and
to improve investor perception.
Judgments must be made by each
company to assess the risks associated with
non-compliance with voluntary corporate
governance codes and the impact such
behaviour might have on the company’s
reputation within the investment com-
munity. Compliance with legislation does
not by itself lead to a competitive advantage,
since all companies in the EU are expected to
do so. Compliance with voluntary corporate
governance codes, however, can be a
competitive advantage. The recommenda-
tions of the Winter Report and the EU
corporate governance action plan give Eur-
opean companies this choice.
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